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1One of the main aims of the European Union (EU) is to be an ethical actor and, as stated as early as
1950 in the Robert Schuman declaration, to contribute to the economic and social progress of the
African continent. This article analyses the impact of EU policies related to fisheries on the economic
and social conditions of fishers’ communities in Africa. It shows how EU policies contribute, and could
contribute further if the EU applied its own principles, to development objectives. It answers the
question: how do EU policies related to fisheries affect economic policies and the well-being of
citizens in Africa, and how can these policies be characterised?
It argues that despite the EU’s rhetoric on the importance of development and of poverty
eradication, its policies in the field of fisheries follow a neo-liberal strategy, and are ethically
problematic as they can drive up unemployment and poverty, harm health and education, ignore
human trafficking, and undermine the position of women.
It is important to study the relation between the EU and Africa in the field of fisheries, as it has high
political, economic and social relevance for not only European economies, but also, and especially,
for African economies.i The EU is the biggest importer of fish in the world: its imports represented 36
per cent of total world imports, for a value of $ 47 billion in 2012. Africa is an important market for
Europe: in 2012, approximately eight per cent of the total fisheries imports of the EU came from
Africa.ii Europe is by far Africa’s first consumer of fish: in 2010, Africa exported $ 3.9 billion worth of
fish to Europe, $ 900 million to Asia, $ 120 million to North America, $ 40 million to South America, $
47 million to Oceania.iii
In order to understand the impact of the EU on economic development of fishers’ communities in
Africa, it is not enough to only analyse the impact of EU’s Fisheries Partnership Agreements (FPAs)
and of EU fisheries subsidies for European fishing fleets, as it is usually done in the literature: it is
also important to consider the impact of EU trade agreements, and EU development aid policies. To
evaluate whether the EU is an ethical actor in its policies related to fisheries, concepts developed by
the philosopher Thomas Pogge can be drawn upon: the EU has both ‘positive duties’ – which it seeks
to fulfil by giving aid and promoting development – and the ‘negative duty’ which is to do no harm.iv I
demonstrate that the EU has problems complying with both types of duties. In order to evaluate
2whether the EU really promotes sustainable development in its current policies related to fisheries, I
consider the relevance of the concept of neo-liberalism from liberal and radical political economy
perspectives. I show that, in accordance with neo-liberalism as understood by radical political
economists, EU policies protect the interests of European fishing fleets, and incorporate very few
measures which would contribute to the economic development of fishers’ communities.
This article is unusual in that it analyses the impact of the EU on the economies of African states in
an Africa-wide context.v In particular, the article focuses on West Africa and Lake Victoria in Central
Africa. West Africa is a relevant case to study, as most EU fisheries agreements are with states in this
region, and as fish exports represent one third of West Africa’s total agricultural exports.vi Lake
Victoria, and in particular Uganda, is also an important case, as Uganda is the biggest exporter of fish
on Lake Victoria and the biggest state in terms of inland water capture in Africa.vii It concentrates on
literature which shows the benefit of, and especially problems with fish trade for the economic
development of African states and fishers’ communities. Secondary sources on EU policies related to
fisheries (both trade and aid) and local conditions of fishers are used together for the first time.
Primary sources are based on official EU documents, on publications by research institutes and
NGOs, on local newspaper articles, and on interviews the author conducted with both EU and NGO
officials in Entebbe, Uganda and Brussels, Belgium.
This article on EU policies related to fisheries contributes to the literature on the limits of the EU’s
development agenda, on the EU as an agenda-setter for politics of states and organisations outside
of the EU (in particular in Africa), and on the EU as an ethical actor.viii It also helps understand the
importance of incorporating development aims in the EU’s policy. Few studies have examined EU
fisheries from an international relations perspective. Over the last decade, some articles have
appeared on the impact of fisheries policies at the ‘micro-level’, that is, on livelihoods, poverty and
food security of local fisheries communities outside Europe, but no article has analysed the impact of
all EU policies related to fisheries on the economic development of fisheries in Africa.ix
The first part of the article shows the strong commitment of the EU to promote the social and
economic development of African economies, and to incorporate development aims in its trade
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impacts of neo-liberal trade policies. The third part shows that EU policies related to fisheries can
raise ethical problems because of their impact on the economy and the social structures in African
states. As the idea of reducing extreme poverty ‘is nothing but an empty incantation as long as the
policies that generate poverty are not analysed and denounced and alternatives proposed,’ the
conclusion offers suggestions on policies which would enable the EU to take on both its negative and
positive duties.x
Ethical aims of EU and policies related to fisheries
The EU’s official aim is to promote development and democracy in its aid and trade policies. The
commitment of the EU to sustainable development was first introduced in 1997 in the Treaty of
Amsterdam.xi In 2003, the European Security Strategy stated that poverty, disease, malnutrition and
hunger were concerns for European leaders. In 2005, the EU clearly established that its aim was
poverty eradication and sustainable development.xii Article 21 of the Lisbon Treaty declares that one
of the objectives of the EU is to ‘foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental
development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty,’ and article 208
states that ‘the Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies
that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries.’xiii In 2012, the EU issued the
‘Agenda for Change,’ which puts the emphasis on improving governance and social protections in
developing nations.xiv As a result, all EU trade policies, including the fisheries policy, are supposed to
diffuse liberal norms and reduce poverty, both in and outside Europe.
Fisheries have been regulated by European institutions since 1957. At the time, the Common
Fisheries Policy (CFP) was part of the agricultural policy. The first council regulations for fisheries
date from October 1970, and they established a set of rules for managing European fishing fleets and
for conserving fish stocks. In 1983, the CFP was agreed as a full package, and it has been revised
every decade. Sustainable development is one of the aims of the EU’s fisheries policy. In 2002, the
Council signed a regulation on the conservation and sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources.xv
4The first major reform of the CFP in regard to development considerations for Africa occurred in 2014.
Its aim was to bring fish stocks back to sustainable levels, put an end to wasteful fishing practices,
and create new opportunities for jobs and growth in coastal areas. In terms of relations with states in
Africa, the EU wants to contribute to sustainable fishing (and have a positive environmental and
socio-economic impact on fish stocks in African states), and fight against iIllegal, unregulated and
unreported (IUU) fishing by improving the monitoring of the activities of EU vessels.xvi The article
highlights the difficulties the EU faces to apply ethical aims to its policies related to fisheries. In order
to fully understand the impact of EU policies on the well-being of fishers in African states, we now turn
to two different theoretical perspectives on the impact of trade on local communities.
Neoliberalism: pure liberal and radical political economy perspectives
The EU advocates both sustainable development and the desire to eradicate poverty, but it is also in
favour of free trade or neo-liberalism, as stated in the EU’s 2020 Strategy, and in the EU’s maritime
security strategy, which aims to guarantee freedom of navigation and protect citizens and marine
resources: traditional trade barriers have to be reduced significantly, and fisheries markets must
become more open. This section shows that neoliberal purists and radical political economists have a
different understanding of the impact of such a neo-liberal policy: the former argue that the African
economy is likely to benefit from trade agreements with the EU, whereas the latter believe that
complete free-trade is impossible, as governments always control trade, and that neo-liberalism has a
negative impact on developing states. This section then examines the literature on the impact of EU
policies related to fisheries, which reflects these two political economic perspectives.
Neoliberalism has two distinct ‘faces’.xvii First, neoliberal purists argue that the market should
operate with maximum deregulation or free trade, and privatisation which ‘calls into question the
existence of national state property.’ For them, developing economies stand to gain the most through
trade liberalisation, as the ‘invisible hand’ of the market should exert benign pressures on economies
in all states in the world.xviii For neoliberal purists, liberalisation means creating jobs, markets, goods
and prosperity.xix It is held to be ‘the most effective poverty reduction strategy the world has ever
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developed and developing states: trade should improve the livelihoods of the poor.xxi
Second, for proponents of radical political economy perspectives, such as historical materialism
and dependency theory, neoliberalism means that there is some kind of state intervention in so-called
‘free trade’: a neoliberal state can provide ‘a vast array of subsidies and tax breaks to corporations.’xxii
They regard neoliberalism as projects which aim at increasing the competitiveness of some states at
the expense of others – in our case that of the EU at the expense of African states.xxiii In practice,
‘strong’ or multinational companies damage local economies.xxiv In the long term, European neoliberal
policies are likely to increase the rich-poor divide between Europe and Africa, and to deepen
exploitation of communities in the developing world.xxv
Neo-liberal purists show that fisheries markets have become more open, and that traditional trade
barriers have been reduced significantly. They argue that fish exports create growth for developing
countries.xxvi Through economic growth, jobs are created, and substantial improvements are made in
educational levels in fishing communities.xxvii
However, a number of authors who question the existence of a ‘trickle down’ effect, have argued
that the international fish trade can harm states’ economies.xxviii Researchers have observed different
types of impact: depletion of fish, exploitation of governments in Africa by Europe through unequal
fishing agreements, loss of local employment opportunities, food insecurity, child malnutrition in
fishing communities, and increasing inequality.xxix
These two different theoretical perspectives are crucial to understanding that the EU’s policies in
terms of trade and aid can be both positive and negative for the well-being of local communities. We
will now analyse the impact of all types of EU policies related to fisheries. We show that the EU, which
can be indirectly responsible for harming the well-being of local communities, should concentrate on
contributing to the needs of these communities.
6Advantages and drawbacks of EU policies related to fisheries for local economies and social
structures
In order to understand the impact of EU policies related to fisheries on local economies and social
structures, five policies need to be examined: 1) FPAs; 2) subsidies for European fishing fleets; 3) EU
regulations on illegal fishing; 4) EU trade agreements (including standards for fish trade); and 5) EU
development aid policies. Each of these policies can have a positive impact on local economies, but
they also create important problems for the well-being of fishers’ communities.
EU Fisheries Partnership Agreements
EU Commission officials maintain that FPAs promote development: ‘the greatest virtue of FPAs is that
they help improve fisheries governance in waters of developing countries.’xxx In practice, radical
political economists have described them as promoting free trade while establishing quotas and
subsidies.xxxi They nevertheless do now aim to promote sustainable development.
Until 2004, EU agreements were clearly detrimental to Africa. EU fisheries agreements were
characterized as 'fish, pay and go' agreements. At the time, the EU was not even concerned with its
‘positive duty’, which implicates a duty of assistance in order to reduce poverty.xxxii It was instead only
interested in its own trade benefits, and disregarded the development aspect of its trade. In today’s
FPAs, the EU purchases access to fish resources – when there are surplus stocks – in the 200-mile
exclusive economic zones of developing states, and in exchange, it provides financial and technical
support for the sustainable development of their fisheries. The EU encourages African states to
control the fishing activities of European and other vessels.xxxiii All FPAs include a Vessel Monitoring
System Protocol in order to make sure vessels are fishing in approved fishing areas.
FPAs can either be tuna agreements or multi-species accords. They seem to be beneficial to the
EU: in 2009, tuna and multi-species agreements provided the EU respectively with € 4.6 and € 1.3 of
added value for € 1 invested.xxxiv In 2016, the EU has bilateral agreements for fishing tuna with Cape
Verde, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Liberia, Madagascar, Mauritius, São Tomé and Príncipe,
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EU. The EU has two multi-species FPAs, with Guinea-Bissau and Mauritania. In the past, Equatorial
Guinea, Morocco and Guinea used to have multi-species accords.xxxv This means that over half of
African biggest exporters of fish do not have FPAs with the EU: these include Morocco, Namibia,
South Africa, Tunisia, Tanzania, and Nigeria.
The impact of fish trade on the economy of states in Africa is considered positive in some states
such as Cape Verde, Senegal and the Seychelles in terms of earnings from exports and impact on
fishers.xxxvi Funds given by the EU contributed to general state reserves and budgets.xxxvii An EU
official mentioned that the EU gave safety material to the Comoros and São Tomé and Príncipe.xxxviii It
replaced some fishers’ ships in Mauritius.
However, there are four problems with EU FPAs. First, they can benefit the EU more than African
states. For instance, one independent report on the agreement with São Tomé and Príncipe to the
European Commission stated: ‘the Agreement … benefits the EU considerably more than São Tomé
and Príncipe, with only 6% of the value-added generated falling to the partner country ….[and] there
has been no benefit in terms of institutional development.xxxix
Second, there have also been some problems with EU funding. This funding can have no or
extremely limited impact on the economy of local fisheries communities – this was the case for São
Tomé and Príncipe, Mauritania and Morocco.xl The EU has been criticised for failing to fulfill its
financial aid commitments towards the development of more sustainable fisheries. This was the case
in Madagascar.xli Another problem with EU funding is that it can be misused, because the EU does
not require the recipient states to make the allocation of funding public. For instance in Guinea
Bissau, patrol vessels purchased with FPA funds were allegedly used for drugs trafficking.xlii Some
governments choose to invest EU funds in non-coastal areas.xliii A Swedish research institute found
‘few signs that the EU money benefits the fisheries sector, at least not small-scale fisheries’.xliv
Third, FPAs can lead to the depletion of fish if there is a lack of management and control of
vessels. Large and mechanised vessels can be dangerous to the environment, as they can decimate
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overcapacity, and Pamela Mace has said that overcapacity is the single most important factor
threatening the long-term viability of exploited fish stocks.xlv However, it is possible to prevent
overexploitation, and there can be a sustainable exploitation of fish through management and
enforcement.xlvi The idea is to establish a Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY), that is, a largest catch
that can be taken from a fish stock over an indefinite period without harming it. EU states and the EU
subscribed to the MSY objective almost thirty years ago in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the
Seas.xlvii But catch limits for tuna only started to be in place for the eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean
management unit in 2007.xlviii In West Africa, overfishing occurred in Congo, Guinea Bissau,
Mauritania, and Senegal.xlix According to the OECD, the EU ‘completely ignored figures on safe catch
levels from the national Mauritanian fisheries research body.’l However, in 2013, the EU agreed to
end decades of overfishing.li Since the 2014 reform, the EU has reduced its capacity to fish in West
Africa. Today, the tuna stock is no longer at risk of collapse, but the extent to which the species has
recovered is uncertain.lii
Fourth, foreign companies do not necessarily create employment in coastal areas. Multinational
corporations make low usage of local processing facilities.liii As a result, poor people lose their
employment in the traditional fish industry, and can no longer own their ships.liv In an ironic twist,
some fishers earn more from transporting migrants to European coasts than from fishing.lv Some
Senegalese fishers have even migrated to Europe.lvi
In a nutshell, African states can be better off without EU agreements: when foreign ships are
refused access to coastal areas in Africa, and African states have the capacity to exploit the surplus
of fish, local coastal economies thrive. For instance in Namibia and Mozambique, fisheries
management improved with the absence of fisheries agreements with the EU.lvii In Senegal in 2012,
the government cancelled 29 fishing authorisations (for Russian, Asian and European vessels), and
‘less than two months after the departure of the foreign trawlers, an increase in daily catch has been
observed in all fishing areas of Senegal’ and in Kafountine city, ‘production has returned to its highest
level in two years.’lviii The Food and Agriculture Organisation stated in 2014 that African states could
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licences to foreign fleets.lix South Africa, which is one of the biggest exporters of fish in Africa, does
not have an agreement with the EU. A South African official said: ‘it is one thing to exchange
preferences for trade in fish and quite another to grant direct access to resources.’lx However, local
fleets can also overexploit fish stocks. Some West African fishers are conducting illegal, unreported
and unregulated (IUU) fishing, including the underreporting of Gross Tonnage. This means that such
fishers not only pay lower license fees than they should to states where they operate, but also that
they have access to fishing areas reserved for artisanal fishermen who are then forced to fish away
from the coast.lxi African states and the EU have to encourage the creation and implementation of
laws on sustainable exploitation of fish for both European and local fleets.
Subsidies to European vessels
EU subsidies contribute to the enhanced capacity of European vessels. The EU fisheries budget has
been on an upward trend since the creation of the CFP. EU support to its fishing industry was € 3.7
billion in 2000-06, then € 4.3 billion in 2007-13, and € 6.4 billion in 2014-20. The 2014-20 fund is
known as the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund.
There are two problems with EU subsidies. First, they have ‘far exceeded the value of
development assistance to the fishing sector provided by DG Development.’lxii Second, they
aggravate the problem of over-exploitation of fish stocks.lxiii
EU regulations on illegal fishing
The EU has regulations to combat illegal fishing. Regulation could contribute to development, as
illegal fishing distorts global markets, presents a major loss of income to coastal countries and
communities, and destroys delicate habitats of fish.lxiv However, these regulations put pressure on
African states. The EU makes these states responsible for dealing with controls, but it provides limited
financial and technical resources for their enforcement. By doing so, in cases where states do not
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have the financial resources to focus on controls, the EU is not abiding by its ‘negative responsibility’
to do no harm.
Illegal fishing occurs, for instance, when trawlers from Europe, and also Russia, China, Japan and
Korea operate off the coasts of West and East Africa with navigation lights out, falsify catch
declarations contravening quotas, or use illegal or environmentally unsustainable fishing gear.lxv
Illegal fishing is possible because ships' captains bribe government officials so they certify that their
catches conform to the rules, and because developing states are unable to monitor and police coastal
areas.lxvi
The EU created a regulation to prevent the import of IUU fish and fish products into the EU, which
was implemented in 2012.lxvii Fish coming into the EU must have a validated catch certificate to show
that the fish has been caught legally. Another regulation established an EU IUU vessel list.lxviii
Following the implementation of the regulations, the EU banned the import of fish from Guinea, as it
refused to cooperate on the regulation on IUU fish. The EU also threatened Ghana in 2013 with trade
sanctions, if they did not prevent their respective vessels from operating illegally in West Africa. As a
result, Ghana has established a dedicated ministry.lxix
The problem with these regulations is that, as stated by the Food and Agriculture Organisation,
developing states ‘bear the brunt of this IUU fishing’.lxx The Marine Resources Assessment Group
reported that many coastal states do not yet have the required Vessel Monitoring System for the
protocols to be implemented, and that some states still rely on vessels themselves to report their
catches.lxxi Experts reported that the EU should ‘acknowledge the vulnerability of developing countries
and the difficulties that they will face in implementing the requirements of the IUU regulation.’lxxii The
EU does not seem to see this as a problem: a high level official at the Commission said in 2008 that
‘ultimately, African governments must protect and manage their own resources.’lxxiii
EU trade agreements
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Trade in fish between the EU and African states is regulated by the EU through Economic Partnership
Agreements. As advocated by neoliberal purists, exports from African states are eligible for duty-free
access to the EU under the Everything But Arms scheme.
Some researchers have argued that the Ugandan economy has benefited from exporting fish to
the EU. In the Great Lakes, the Nile perch has become a ‘money-minter’.lxxiv For some experts,
fisheries in Lake Victoria have also generated a higher GDP, employment substantial foreign
exchange, and a better quality of life of local communities.lxxv Fish exports have also been positive for
the economy in Namibia, as it earned rent from its fisheries by collecting quota fees.lxxvi
However, the impact of fish exports has been negative in other African states. It had a negative
impact in Ghana: on the economy because of the monopoly power of one multinational firm, and
because of substantial informal cross-border trade; on artisanal fishers, because of the competition
with industrial fishing for export; on fish workers with the closure of numerous firms when EU quality
standards were imposed; and on fish consumers and resources.lxxvii The EU might have also had a
negative impact in Uganda, which exports its fish mainly to the EU. Only 15 out of its once over 20
fish factories were still operational in 2013, and this was because the factories were no longer
competitive.lxxviii
Another problem with EU trade agreements is that trade occurs with no overseeing of the impact
on fisheries’ resources. Depletion of fish and loss of diversity in terms of species richness is partly a
result of exploitation by Europe. For instance, most of the fish coming from Lake Victoria has lost its
diversity, and is exported to the EU (that is, to France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain).lxxix
EU trade agreements include regulations on standards for fish trade. The EU has market access
rules which limit the trade capacity of African states: fish has to be obtained by European or African
vessels only, so African states which want to rent other foreign vessels to fish, are unable to do so. In
addition, African states have to meet EU safety regulations, and these too are costly.lxxx Here again,
the EU is creating costs for African states, and it could help to cover them.
12
EU aid policy
EU aid and trade policies should be complementary. Similarly to what Dani Rodrik advocated for the
world trading regime, if the EU really wants to be an ethical actor, it has to ‘shift from a "market
access" mindset to a "development" mindset.’lxxxi EU aid policy is given both to African states and to
Africa as a whole. This section analyses some of the EU programmes for Africa as a whole.
In the period 2007-13, the EU gave Africa only € 126 million to promote sustainable fisheries and
aquaculture on the whole continent. In particular, in 2013, the EU decided to support the African
Union’s pan-African strategy for fisheries and aquaculture, which aims at enhancing the contribution
of fisheries resources to food security and economic growth in Africa. It also gave € 15 million for
2014-15 to create an Atlantic Ocean Tuna Tagging Programme. Four other projects financed by the
EU are currently under implementation in Western Africa: The West African Marine Ecoregion
(WAMER) programme addresses governance and policies governing marine resources and poverty
alleviation in the West African Eco region. The Fish trade project is run by WorldFish, the African
Union and New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) – funding for this amounts to € 5
million over five years. It works to encourage intra-regional fish trade and improve food security in
sub-Saharan Africa. The ADUPES project provides support to sustainable fisheries management in
Senegal. The ECOFISH project aims at ensuring sustainable fisheries in Angola, Namibia and South
Africa.
If the EU wants to comply with its duty to do no harm and contribute to the economic development
of local communities in African states, these measures are far from sufficient. The EU overlooks many
of the difficult local social and economic conditions under which its trade in fisheries takes place. It
could address the problems faced by fishers’ communities, such as health problems (malnutrition and
HIV), lack of education, human trafficking, and gender discrimination, especially as some authors
argue that there is a correlation between export and these problems.lxxxii The following paragraphs
analyse these points, with a focus on conditions of fishers from Lake Victoria.
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There are possible links between exports of fish to Europe and health problems, such as
malnutrition. Some authors would disagree. Béné’s statistical analysis shows that, at the macro-
economic level, fish trade does not seem to negatively affect food security in Sub-Saharan Africa.lxxxiii
Geheb et al. argue there is no direct linear relationship between Nile perch export and the high
frequency of malnutrition among population around Lake Victoria.lxxxiv However, fish, a major source of
protein, is exported directly to Europe, and is not eaten by local communities in Africa.lxxxv In 2000,
one coastal town on Lake Victoria in Kenya, where 80 per cent of the Nile perch factories were
located, had the highest percentage of population suffering from food deficiency and absolute
poverty.lxxxvi A study conducted in Western Kenya found that almost half of all children under five
suffered from stunted growth as a result of fish deficit.lxxxvii In Uganda, consumption of fruit,
vegetables, and animal protein, including fish has been discouraged by high and rapidly rising costs
as well as poor availability, especially in rural areas.lxxxviii The skin, the head and the skeleton of the
fish (known as ‘fille’) are sold to local populations around Lake Victoria, while the fillet is packed for
export.lxxxix There is a clear deficiency of fish in diets of people in Africa. In Europe in 2014, 22 kg of
fish per person was consumed in a year compared to only 9 kg per person in Africa.xc In addition, food
insecurity and gendered vulnerability can fuel HIV/AIDS.xci
The education of children can also be compromised, as they are encouraged by their parents to
work in the fishing industry rather than go to school. Although Eggert et al. argue that education has
improved in the fishers’ community in Tanzania, Westaway et al. highlight that there is a low
educational attainment in Ugandan fishing communities, as very few children complete primary school
and even fewer successfully transition to secondary school.xcii A Ugandan newspaper also reported in
2013 that, due to lack of funding, ‘Naku’s [a woman selling ‘fille’ on a local market in Kampala]
children dropped out of school and joined her’: the education problem is linked to that of child
labour.xciii
As any other type of local company, local companies which trade fish with companies in Europe
can be involved in human trafficking.xciv For instance, the newspaper New Vision in Uganda reported
in 2008 that: ‘some Asian businessmen [in the fishing industry in Uganda] lure workers from India and
Pakistan, with promises of good pay. Upon arrival, however, they seize their passports and exploit
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them shamelessly, forcing them to work long hours with little or no pay.’xcv In West Africa, Interpol
notes that ‘there is increasing evidence’ of individuals trafficked for forced labour to work on legal or
illegal fishing vessels, and that ‘child trafficking…exists in the artisanal sector in Lake Volta,
Ghana.’xcvi
Women also face discrimination as a result of industrial fishing. Around Lake Victoria, some
women profit from Nile perch exports, but many women, who represented the majority of traditional
fishmongers, are marginalised by the industrialisation of the fishery, and excluded from its monetary
benefits.xcvii In order to address some of these problems, the EU is ‘strengthening national and
regional institutions for the sustainable management of fisheries on Lake Victoria, and infrastructure
works to improve sanitary conditions in 17 fish landing sites in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania’, but this
is clearly insufficient.xcviii
Conclusion and policy recommendations
For the EU to claim to be an ethical actor in its policies related to fisheries, it has to fulfill positive
duties such as foreign aid and trade policies which help development, and the negative duty to stop
contributing to poverty.xcix
As regards FPAs, the EU could establish limits on the number of European vessels present in
African waters. In the long term, FPAs could be replaced with trade agreements with a clause on
fisheries: where EU vessels are a threat to the well-being of local fishers, EU vessels would not be
authorised to fish within another state’s exclusive economic zone. This refusal of access would have
to prevail for all foreign vessels.
In the field of fisheries subsidies to European vessels, it must reduce, and eventually eliminate
them. The Director of the Fisheries Economics Research Unit at the University of British Columbia in
Canada, Rashid Sumaila, said in 2002 that the EU should eliminate or redirect harmful subsidies.c
Further regulation to combat illegal fishing is needed. The EU should help African states to monitor
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and sanction vessels which are damaging the environment, and acting illegally, particularly close to
shore, and with illegal nets. The EU is for instance currently considering banning seafood products
from Thailand if it does not regulate its illegal fishing industry and prevent the use of slave labour.
In terms of trade policy, the EU should contribute to restoring fish species. For instance in Uganda,
fish quotas could be introduced for exporters, as this would help minimise competition on the lake.
However, this policy is likely to encounter strong lobbying by fish processors and exporters.ci The EU
could also introduce further sustainable fisheries labels in the areas where fish is depleted. It could
encourage the development of regional trade among African states.
Local knowledge and well-being must be protected.cii The EU should increase its development aid,
and should require the recipient state to disclose the way it uses EU funding. The EU should give
small-scale fishers opportunities, entitlements and capabilities in order to improve their income and
provide food security.ciii These include: education, healthcare, status of women, sanitation, electricity,
communication, infrastructure, transportation, credit, and development of fleet capacity.civ For
instance, the EU could include conditions in its trade agreements. It could recommend that fishers are
paid as much as in manufacturing or retail trade. It could ask states to follow the example of Namibia,
and require that fish workers get medical aid, pension cover, housing and free transport to work.cv It
could recommend that women have a say in resource management.cvi
Finally, if the EU wants to be an ethical actor, it could encourage African states and local
communities to have an appropriate negotiation capacity.cvii Fishers’ communities (both men and
women, and both representatives of industrialised groups and small-scale fishers) should be present
at negotiations on trade agreements, fisheries agreements, and aid policy. When the Commission
made a report on a possible agreement with Liberia, Liberia was not consulted.cviii African states
should be encouraged to register the fisheries sector to the budget of the EU’s development policy
directed towards them. The EU could help fishers’ communities financially to set up trade unions and
transborder groups, as these communities lack resources in order to make their voices heard). The
EU could ensure that trade unions protect fishers by mirroring the position of the United States in
Vietnam. If the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement which was signed in 2016 is ratified,
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the United States will incorporate labour law into its trade relations with Vietnam. The United States –
Viet Nam Plan for the Enhancement of Trade and Labour Relations states that ‘Viet Nam shall ensure
that its laws and regulations permit workers, without distinction, employed by an enterprise to form a
grassroots labour union of their own choosing without prior authorisation.’cix The voices of local
communities in Africa should also be heard in all types of EU decisions, including in the security field,
as security is linked to development. In 2014, the EU maritime security strategy focused mostly on EU
interests, not on interests of third parties: it was decided by EU leaders without considering the views
of African leaders or local communities.
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